Face processing in Williams syndrome is already atypical in infancy by D'Souza, Dean et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 15 June 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00760
Edited by:
Bozana Meinhardt-Injac,
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz, Germany
Reviewed by:
Brian W. Haas,
University of Georgia, USA
Bianca Jovanovic,
Justus Liebig University Giessen,
Germany
*Correspondence:
Annette Karmiloff-Smith,
Department of Psychological
Sciences, Centre for Brain and
Cognitive Development, Birkbeck,
University of London, 32 Torrington
Square, London WC1E 7HX, UK
a.karmiloff-smith@bbk.ac.uk
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Perception Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 27 March 2015
Accepted: 22 May 2015
Published: 15 June 2015
Citation:
D’Souza D, Cole V, Farran EK,
Brown JH, Humphreys K, Howard J,
Rodic M, Dekker TM, D’Souza H and
Karmiloff-Smith A (2015) Face
processing in Williams syndrome
is already atypical in infancy.
Front. Psychol. 6:760.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00760
Face processing in Williams
syndrome is already atypical in
infancy
Dean D’Souza 1, Victoria Cole 2, Emily K. Farran 3, Janice H. Brown 4, Kate Humphreys 5,
John Howard 1, Maja Rodic 6, Tessa M. Dekker 7, Hana D’Souza 6 and
Annette Karmiloff-Smith 1*
1 Department of Psychological Sciences, Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development, Birkbeck, University of London,
London, UK, 2 Department of Biostatistics, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London, London, UK, 3 Department
of Psychology and Human Development, Institute of Education, University College London, London, UK, 4 Department
of Psychology, London South Bank University, London, UK, 5 Institute of Child Health, University College London, London,
UK, 6 Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK, 7 Department of Visual Neuroscience,
Institute of Ophthalmology, University College London, London, UK
Face processing is a crucial socio-cognitive ability. Is it acquired progressively or does it
constitute an innately-specified, face-processing module? The latter would be supported
if some individuals with seriously impaired intelligence nonetheless showed intact face-
processing abilities. Some theorists claim that Williams syndrome (WS) provides such
evidence since, despite IQs in the 50s, adolescents/adults with WS score in the
normal range on standardized face-processing tests. Others argue that atypical neural
and cognitive processes underlie WS face-processing proficiencies. But what about
infants with WS? Do they start with typical face-processing abilities, with atypicality
developing later, or are atypicalities already evident in infancy? We used an infant
familiarization/novelty design and compared infants with WS to typically developing
controls as well as to a group of infants with Down syndrome matched on both
mental and chronological age. Participants were familiarized with a schematic face, after
which they saw a novel face in which either the features (eye shape) were changed
or just the configuration of the original features. Configural changes were processed
successfully by controls, but not by infants with WS who were only sensitive to featural
changes and who showed syndrome-specific profiles different from infants with the other
neurodevelopmental disorder. Our findings indicate that theorists can no longer use the
case of WS to support claims that evolution has endowed the human brain with an
independent face-processing module.
Keywords: infancy, Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, face processing, featural, configural, nativism,
progressive modularization
Introduction
Faces provide us with important social information.We use them to guide our actions and to engage
in social behavior. They are also ubiquitous in the environment. It is therefore not surprising that
faces acquire a special status among visual stimuli. For instance, face recognition ismore disrupted by
stimulus inversion than is object recognition (Yin, 1969). There also exist adult neuropsychological
patients who lose the ability to recognize objects but not faces (Moscovitch et al., 1997;
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Duchaine and Nakayama, 2005), and vice versa (Bodamer, 1990;
Kanwisher, 2000; Busigny et al., 2010). Moreover, functional
neuroimaging studies have revealed a region of cerebral
cortex—the fusiform face area (FFA)—that is significantly more
activated for faces than for non-face stimuli such as assorted
objects (Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997), strings
of letters (Puce et al., 1996), animals without heads (Kanwisher
et al., 1999), or the backs of human heads (Tong et al., 2000).
Also, faces start to acquire their special status from a very early
age. For example, neonates track moving face-like stimuli farther
than other visual patterns of comparable complexity, contrast,
and spatial frequency (Goren et al., 1975; Johnson et al., 1991).
This, along with evidence that face processing is localized in
the adult brain, has led to claims in the literature that evolution
has endowed the human brain with an independent, minimally
interactive, face-processing module (Kanwisher, 2000, 2010).
Further claims for this nativist, modular perspective call
on a rare genetic disorder, Williams syndrome (WS: for full
genotypic/phenotypic details, see Farran and Karmiloff-Smith,
2012). Adolescents and adults withWS are seriously impaired in a
range of domains (e.g., spatial cognition, number, and problem
solving; Donnai and Karmiloff-Smith, 2000), have an average
IQ of 56 (Mervis and Bertrand, 1997), and yet they perform
within the normal range on standardized face-processing tests
(Bellugi et al., 1988a; Deruelle et al., 2003; Tager-Flusberg et al.,
2003). This has lead to claims in the literature of an “intact,”
“spared,” or “preserved” face-processing module in WS (Bellugi
et al., 1988b, 1994; Wang et al., 1995). Nonetheless, the question
of whether face processing is “normal” in this population or
calls on atypical neuro-cognitive processes remains hotly debated
(Mills et al., 2000; Deruelle et al., 2003; Tager-Flusberg et al.,
2003; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004; D’Souza and Karmiloff-Smith,
2011).
Observational studies revealed that infants and young children
withWS are fascinated with faces and spend more time looking at
them than at objects (Mervis and Bertrand, 1997; Bellugi et al.,
2000; Laing et al., 2002). Experimental studies also found that
adolescents and adults with WS perform within (or near) the
normal range on standardized face-processing tasks, such as the
Benton Facial Recognition Test (Benton et al., 1983) and the
Rivermead Face Memory Task (Wilson et al., 1986). But could
there be different (i.e., atypical) neuro-cognitive underpinnings
to their success on these tasks? For instance, rather than using
normal configural processing, it is possible to recognize “faces”
on the Benton test by detecting specific features within the face
stimuli (e.g., a nose; Duchaine and Nakayama, 2004).
One of the classic claims in the literature about how face
recognition is special and differs from object recognition is that
the former relies on holistic or configural processing (Tanaka
and Farah, 1993). “Holistic” processing occurs whenever a system
processes the emergent features of stimuli—e.g., the overall gestalt
of a face or, for instance, the area of a square, rather than
the lines that make up the square (Piepers and Robbins, 2012).
“Configural” information, by contrast, refers to the relationship
between features and involves two levels of processing: first-order
and second-order configural processing. Specifically, first-order
configural information refers to the basic configuration of features
(eyes above mouth), while second-order configural information
refers to the brain’s computation of precise variations in the
spacing between these features (see Piepers and Robbins, 2012,
for discussion). An important study by Deruelle et al. (1999;
see also Rossen et al., 1995) found that, relative to controls,
individuals with WS are better at processing the featural than the
configural information of a face. Children and adults with WS
(from 7 to 23 years of age) had to decide whether two pictures
of faces, presented in upright and inverted conditions, were the
“same” or “different.” TD controls usually process upright faces
configurally and inverted faces featurally (Young et al., 1987; Leder
and Bruce, 2000), and aremore successful at upright than inverted
faces: known as the face inversion effect (Yin, 1969). By contrast,
Deruelle et al. (1999) discovered that the participants with WS
were less subject to the inversion effect than chronological age
(CA)- and mental age (MA)-matched controls. The researchers
proposed that individuals with WS have a bias to process featural
over configural information, even when faces are upright. This
dovetails with studies that show a similar pattern in other visuo-
spatial domains in WS, leading to the claim that individuals with
the disorder are “featural processors” (Pani et al., 1999; but see
D’Souza et al., 2015).
However, in a later study, Deruelle et al. (2003) argued that
face processing is “preserved” in individuals with WS. Children
and adolescents (6–17 years) with WS were instructed to match
faces to either a low- or high-spatial frequency filtered target face,
with the hypothesis that low-spatial frequency filters would call
upon holistic processing and high-spatial frequency filters would
require configural processing. The participants withWS as well as
the CA- and MA-matched controls all found it easier to process
low spatially filtered faces than high ones, and did not differ
significantly from each other. No effect of age was found either. It
seems reasonable to conclude that all three groups had developed
the ability to process faces holistically and were at ceiling (i.e., by
6 years of age).
Tager-Flusberg et al. (2003) also presented findings on face
processing in WS. It was an important study because of its
large sample size: 47 adolescents/adults with WS, 39 CA-
matched controls. These participants were tested on a number of
tasks, including the Benton and a part-whole paradigm (Tanaka
and Farah, 1993). Tager-Flusberg et al. (2003) found that the
surrounding face context had the same effect on individuals with
WS as it did for CA-matched controls. The authors concluded that
face processing is normal in WS.
However, Karmiloff-Smith et al. (2004) argued that some
researchers were conflating two different concepts: “holistic” and
“configural” processing, and that the findings of Deruelle, Tager-
Flusberg, and others did indeed provide evidence of relatively
proficient “holistic” processing in WS, but not of second-order
“configural” processing which develops later in TD (Maurer et al.,
2002;Mondloch et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2013). Asmentioned above,
first-order holistic processing occurs when a face is processed
directly as a “gestalt” (i.e., fusion between different elements in an
array—a low-level visual phenomena). The debate, according to
Karmiloff-Smith et al. (2004) is not whether individuals with WS
can process a face as a gestalt, they can, but whether theymake use
of featural or precise configural information (or both). And herein
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lies the crux of the issue, the focus of our paper: Is featural and/or
configural face processing atypical in WS?
Holistic and configural face processing are both involved in
normal face recognition. But they develop at different times and
at different rates. Holistic processing, pace Carey and Diamond
(1977), develops early in infancy (i.e., from at least 3 months of
age; Turati et al., 2010), whereas configural and featural processing
develops later and at a much slower rate (Liu et al., 2013).
Karmiloff-Smith et al. (2004) identified both delay and deviance
in face processing in adolescents and adults with WS, specifically
with the processing of configural information. In other words,
they found that although face processing is relatively proficient
in WS, it develops atypically. This had also been confirmed
by neuroimaging and event-related potential (ERP) studies of
anomalous brain activation in WS during face recognition (Mills
et al., 2000; Grice et al., 2003; Mobbs et al., 2004), as well
as by recent developmental studies which revealed atypically
developmental trajectories of configural face processing in older
children with the disorder (Annaz et al., 2009; Dimitriou et al.,
2014). The FFA has also been found to be larger in WS than
in TD controls, which may also reflect atypical face processing
(Golarai et al., 2010).Whether theWS brain starts out with a large
FFA, or whether its unusual volume emerges as a result of overly
focused face processing in young children (Karmiloff-Smith et al.,
2012), remains an open debate. Nonetheless, these are important
findings, because they highlight atypicalities in face processing in
this syndrome.
In sum, there is currently no consensus on whether face
processing is typical in WS. Yet evidence that face processing
in WS is prima facie typical has been used to support the
claim that evolution has endowed the human infant brain
with independently functioning modules dedicated to specific
functions, e.g., face processing (Kanwisher et al., 1997). So, when
individuals with WS present with much more serious deficits
in some domains (e.g., visuo-spatial) than others (e.g., face
processing), it is taken as evidence of “impaired” and “spared”
modules in WS (see D’Souza and Karmiloff-Smith, 2011, for
discussion). Individuals with WS should not be seen as having
a normal brain with impaired and spared parts, but rather as
having a brain that is developing differently (Karmiloff-Smith,
1997, 1998). We hypothesize that the ability to perceive a face may
appear “intact” when using basic standardized tests, but actually
more sensitive measures will reveal that it develops atypically in
WS. Face perception involves three different levels of processing:
holistic, configural, and featural. Empirical studies (hitherto
mainly of adolescents and adults) provide strong evidence—and a
broad consensus—that holistic processing is relatively proficient
in WS. By contrast, there is also behavioral and neural evidence
from several labs (Mills et al., 2000; Deruelle et al., 2003; Grice
et al., 2003; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004; Mobbs et al., 2004;
Dimitriou et al., 2014), that configural processing may develop
atypically in WS, and a possibility that featural processing is
also atypical (Karmiloff-Smith, 1997). However, hitherto these
processes have been examined in older children, adolescents and
adults with WS. But what about infants with WS? Do they start
with similar face-processing abilities to typically developing (TD)
infants, with atypicality developing later, or are the atypicalities
already evident in infancy? This is an important question, because
even if a general consensus does emerge that face processing is
atypical in older children, adolescents, and adults with WS, then
we would still need to know: (1) whether there is an atypicality in
featural (as well as configural) processing (see Karmiloff-Smith,
1997), (2) whether the atypicality is present early in infancy or
the outcome of a protracted developmental process that has been
operating under atypical constraints, and (3) whether infants with
WS show the same configural processing impairment observed
in adolescents and adults with WS, or whether they also show a
different impairment (i.e., featural).
To answer these questions, the present study compared featural
and configural processing in infants/toddlers with WS with MA-
matched TD control infants/toddlers. We also included a group
of infants/toddlers with Down syndrome (DS) for two reasons.
First, it was important to ascertain whether the WS profile
was syndrome specific or simply due to low IQ, so the two
neurodevelopmental disorder groups were matched on both CA
and MA. Second, DS was selected as a comparison group because
there is some evidence in the literature that whereas individuals
with WS show a processing bias to featural over configural
information, the opposite pattern obtains for DS (Bihrle et al.,
1989; Bellugi et al., 1999; but see D’Souza et al., 2015). In the
current study, we presented infants with two faces, a familiar
face and either a (novel) featurally-changed face or a (novel)
configurally-changed one.
We hypothesized that the infants/toddlers with WS would
discriminate between the familiar face and the (novel) featurally-
changed face, but not between the familiar face and the (novel)
configurally-changed face. We predicted that the opposite pattern
would hold for DS, and that the TD controls (who usually process
upright faces configurally) would display proficiency in both
conditions, albeit with stronger effects in the configural condition.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 92 infants were tested: 29 infants/toddlers with WS,
20 infants/toddlers with DS, and 43 TD controls. The children
with WS or DS had been tested either for a microdeletion of
the ELN gene via fluorescence in situ hybridization or for full
trisomy 21. All participants were assessed using the Bayley Scales
of Infant Development (Bayley, 1993). Data from an overall 24
infants/toddlers (eight WS, nine DS, seven TD) were excluded
from the study due to fussiness or drowsiness. Table 1 shows the
mean CAs andMAs for the remaining 68 participants. The groups
did not significantly differ on MA, F2;65 = 0.86, p = 0.429 (see
Results).
TABLE 1 | Mean (SD) chronological age (CA) and mental age (MA) for each
group.
Group n CA in months (SD) MA in months (SD)
WS 21 26.1 (6.6) 14.0 (5.6)
DS 11 30.5 (11.7) 16.4 (6.3)
Control 36 14.3 (4.4) 14.1 (4.7)
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Stimuli and Apparatus
The stimuli were schematic faces: 7 cm (2.75 inch) yellow
circles, with four black elements (two “eyes,” one “nose,” and
one “mouth”) on a black background. This basic schematic
face (Figure 1) was used as the familiarization stimulus. Two
featurally-modified and two configurally-modified versions of
this basic stimulus were also created. The featural changes were
made by replacing the round eyes with similarly sized squares
or diamonds; the configural changes were made by stretching or
squashing the features toward or away from the centre by 20 pixels
(see Figures 1 and 2, for examples).We opted for schematic rather
than real faces for several reasons. First, it had already been shown
that infants’ gaze behaviors to naturalistic faces do not differ
from their behaviors to schematic faces (e.g., Farroni et al., 2005).
Second, several studies have shown that the mechanisms involved
in processing schematic faces are the same as those involved in
processing naturalistic faces (see Johnson et al., 2015, for review).
We therefore decided to use schematic faces because they are
simpler to control andmanipulate, can be presented in a very large
format, with very strong color contrasts that capture and hold
infants’ attention.
The infants were seated on their parent’s lap 60 cm (2 ft) away
from a 97 cm  56 cm (38 inch  22 inch) monitor screen, in
a dimly lit room with blank, off-white walls. The parents were
instructed to look straight ahead and not at the stimuli, and to
refrain from interacting with their child during the experiment. A
video camera focused on the infant’s face was mounted just under
the monitor. The camera was connected to a VCR and monitor
screen where the experimenter, who was hidden behind curtains,
FIGURE 1 | An example of a test trial in the Featural condition. The
stimulus on the left is an example of a featurally-changed face, while the
stimulus on the right is the familiarized face.
FIGURE 2 | An example of a test trial in the Configural condition. The
stimulus on the right is an example of a configurally-changed face, while the
stimulus on the left is the familiarized face.
couldwatch the infant live. For coding purposes, the experimenter
used a “picture-in-picture” tool that showed the display of the
infant’s screen in the corner of the experimenter’s monitor screen.
The coder could therefore simultaneously see the infant’s face and
the display that the infant was looking at.
Design and Procedure
Participants were presented with eight test trials. Each test trial
was preceded by four familiarization trials, except for the first
test trial, which was preceded by eight familiarization trials
to be sure of familiarizing the infants with the model face.
The familiarization trials consisted of one yellow schematic face
(the familiarized face) on a black background (Figure 1). The
test trials consisted of two faces presented side by side—one
familiarized face, and one novel face (see Figures 1 and 2, for
examples).While the familiarized face remained unchanged, there
were four novel faces: two configurally-changed faces (one with
the features of the face “squashed,” the other “stretched”) and
two featurally-changed faces (one with square eyes, one with
diamond eyes). Each of these faces was presented once on the
left-hand side of the screen, and once on the right. The order
of the eight test trials was randomized and subsequently fixed
(in the following order: featural, configural, featural, configural,
featural, configural, configural, featural). So every participant
was presented with the same sequence of trials. The fixed order
was presented to each participant, using E-prime (Psychological
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA).
Before the start of each trial, a noisy visual distractor was used
to attract the child’s attention to the screen. The trial started once
the childwas looking at the screen. Each familiarization trial lasted
2 s; each test trial, 4 s. The entire experiment lasted no longer
than 3 min. All experimental procedures were in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki, and were approved by the
Departmental Ethics Committee, Department of Psychological
Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London.
Preferential looking times were coded frame-by-frame using
SuperCoder 1.5 (Hollich, 2005). The coder was blind to the
experimental hypothesis. A second experimenter coded 10% of
the trials. Inter-rater reliability was very high (r = 0.96).
Results
Chronological Age (CA) and Mental Age (MA)
Matching
The CA data in the Control group were non-normal
[ZSkewness = 0.09, D(36) = 0.16, p = 0.019]. Because the
Control data had a (continuous) uniform distribution, rather
than transforming the data, a non-parametric test (Independent-
Samples Kruskal–Wallis) was used. As expected, the distribution
of CA was significantly different across the three groups,
H(2)= 34.81, p< 0.001. However, pairwise comparisons revealed
that the DS (Mdn= 30.00) andWS (Mdn= 27.10) groups did not
significantly differ on CA,U = 3.03,$2 = 0.41, p= 1.000. CAwas
significantly different in the TD control group (Mdn= 14.22) than
in both the DS and WS groups, U = 30.26, $2 = 4.44, p < 0.001,
U = 27.23, $2 = 5.02, p < 0.001, respectively. Because the DS
and WS data were normally distributed (i.e., ZSkewness < 2,
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of target looking for each condition
(featural, configural) and group (TD controls, Williams
syndrome, Down syndrome). A PTL above 0.5 indicates longer
looking to the novel face than to the familiarized face; a PTL below 0.5
signifies longer looking to the familiarized face than to the novel face.
Error bars represent 1 SEM.
Kolmogorov–Smirnov, p > 0.05), an independent t-test was
also carried out. It confirmed that the two groups were not
significantly different on CA, t(30)= 1.38, p= 0.178.
Mental age data were normally distributed. A one way ANOVA
showed that the groups did not significantly differ on MA,
F2;65 = 0.86, p= 0.429, showing that the atypical groups were well
matched to one another and to the TD controls.
Proportion of Target Looking
For each participant and each test trial, the proportion of target
looking (PTL) was calculated. PTL is the total amount of time
spent looking at the “target” stimulus (i.e., the novel face) as a
proportion of the total amount of time spent looking at both
the target and the “non-target” stimuli (i.e., the novel face + the
familiar face). No data were excluded from these analyses, because
none were three standard deviations greater or smaller than the
group mean.
The PTL data were normally distributed. There were no
main effects of Group, F2;65 = 1.13, p = 0.328, or Condition,
F1;65 = 0.003, p = 0.955. Nor was there an interaction effect,
F2;65 = 1.17, p= 0.317. Figure 3 illustrates the data from the PTL
analysis.
Longest Look Difference
Proportion of target looking represents an infant’s relative interest
over the course of an entire trial/experiment. It is one of the
most common measures used by infant researchers to investigate
cognitive phenomena. However, it does lack sensitivity. For
instance, a participant might look for longer at one face (e.g., the
target) and then, after building up an internal representation of it,
switch to the other face, simply out of interest, before the trial has
ended. This would reduce the likelihood of detecting a difference
in looking behavior between the two faces. We therefore used
another common, but more sensitive, measure—namely, longest
look difference (LLD)—over the first four and last four test trials.
We would expect a difference in the first four test trials but not in
the last four test trials.
Test Trials 1–4
The first four trials (featural left familiar right, configural left
familiar right, familiar left featural right, familiar left configural
right) were analyzed. As before, data that were three standard
deviations greater or smaller than the group mean were excluded
from the analyses on a trial basis (data only from two trials from
2 TD participants needed to be excluded). The LLD data were
sufficiently normal.
TD children
As expected for the first four trials, one-sample t-tests indicated
that longer looks to the configurally-changed face were greater
than the chance level of 0 in the TD group, t(34) = 2.69,
p = 0.011, r = 0.42. This is considered the normal way for TD
participants to process faces. We would, however, also expect
TD controls to notice featural changes, albeit less strongly, and
indeed a trend emerged with respect to the featurally-changed
face, but the analysis did not survive a Bonferroni correction
(p> 0.05).
Williams syndrome
As predicted, a one-sample t-test indicated that longer looks to
the featurally-changed face were greater than chance in the WS
group, t(20)= 2.09, p= 0.050, r= 0.46, but not to the configurally-
changed face.
Down syndrome
Longer looks were not significantly greater than chance in the
DS group (p > 0.05) for either the featurally-changed or the
configurally-changed faces.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 7605
D’Souza et al. Face processing in Williams syndrome
FIGURE 4 | Longest look difference (single longest look to the
novel face minus the single longest look to the familiarized
face, in seconds) for each condition (featural, configural) and
group (TD controls, Williams syndrome, Down syndrome). A
positive LLD indicates a longer longest look to the novel face than to
the familiarized face; a negative LLD signifies a longer longest look
to the familiarized face than to the novel face. Error bars represent
1 SEM.
Intergroup analyses
A 3 2mixed-design ANOVAwith LLDFirst (featural, configural)
as a within-subjects factor and Group (TD control, WS, DS)
as a between-subjects factor revealed no main effect of LLD,
F1;63 = 0.25, p = 0.617, or Group, F2;63 = 0.88, p = 0.420.
In other words, LLDfeatural did not differ from LLDconfigural, and
the three groups did not differ on “LLD.” However, there was
an interaction between LLD (featural, configural) and Group,
F2;63 = 5.30, p = 0.007, !2p = 0.14 (Figure 4). Post hoc t-tests
revealed a significant difference between the WS and TD control
groups on LLDFeatural, t(54) = 3.05, p = 0.004, r = 0.38. No other
result survived the Bonferroni correction.
Order effects
To investigate order effects, we examined whether LLD for
the first presentation of the configurally-changed face was
significantly different from LLD for the second presentation of
the configurally-changed face. If there were order effects, then
we would expect LLD to change between the first and second
presentations. Yet no significant changes were detected in the TD
control group, t(36) = 1.48, p = 0.149, WS group, t(20) = 1.45,
p= 0.162, or DS group, t(10)= 0.39, p= 0.707.
We also compared LLD for the first presentation of the
featurally-changed face with LLD for the second presentation of
the featurally-changed face. Again, if there were order effects, then
we would expect LLD to change between the first and second
presentations. Yet no significant changes were detected in the TD
control group, t(36) = 0.23, p = 0.820, WS group, t(20) = 0.11,
p= 0.914, or DS group, t(10)= 0.90, p= 0.387.
Test Trials 5–8
The last four trials were also analyzed. Data that were three
standard deviations greater or smaller than the group mean were
excluded from the analyses on a trial basis (data only from four
trials from 1 TD, 1WS, and 1 DS participants were excluded). The
LLD data were sufficiently normal.
As predicted for the last four trials, neither LLDfeatural nor
LLDconfigural differed from chance in any of the groups (all
p > 0.05). A 3  2 mixed-design ANOVA with LLDLast (featural,
configural) as a within-subjects factor and Group (TD control,
WS, DS) as a between-subjects factor revealed no main effect of
LLD, F1;62 < 0.01, p = 0.968, or Group, F2;62 = 0.93, p = 0.400;
nor was there an interaction effect, F2;62 = 0.42, p= 0.662.
Discussion
Typical face identification entails processing (1) the features of a
face, (2) the configuration of these features or precise variations
in the spacing between these features, and (3) the face holistically
(i.e., as a gestalt). The latter (i.e., holistic face processing) develops
in the first months of life in typical development and is relatively
proficient in individuals with WS. This has led to claims in the
literature that WS (which is characterized by an uneven cognitive
profile) presents a unique case of “impaired” and “spared”
cognitive modules—with face processing being an example of
a spared cognitive module. However, although holistic face
processing is proficient in this population, there is evidence that
featural and/or configural face processingmay be atypical in older
children, adolescents, and adults with this syndrome. Indeed, our
study revealed that this is the case in infants/toddlers with WS.
As predicted, the TD controls showed a significant discrimination
between the familiarized and configurally-changed faces, and
a weaker discrimination between familiarized and featurally-
changed faces. By contrast, and in accordancewith our hypothesis,
we found that the infants/toddlers with WS failed to discriminate
between the faces in the Configural condition, yet showed a
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novelty preference for the featurally-changed face. This suggests
that infants, like older children and adults with WS, have atypical
face processing strategies and use predominantly featural rather
than configural information to process upright faces.
In other words, although individuals withWS can process faces,
our data reveal that they use an atypical strategy to do so. This is
an important finding because it means that theorists can no longer
argue for the existence of an “intact,” “spared,” or “preserved” face-
processing module in WS.
Could theorists argue that face processing is “spared” in infancy
and any failure in older children and adults is merely the outcome
of a common developmental process that is operating under
different (atypical) constraints? This is unlikely, because the
present study demonstrates that both featural and configural face
processing atypicalities are already evident in infancy. Thus, our
data suggest that face processing in WS is already atypical in
infancy.
This is a novel finding. It was once thought that face
processing was intact in WS. However, evidence has been
mounting that one aspect of face processing (configural) develops
atypically in older children, adolescents, and adults with WS.
Furthermore, a preliminary study hinted that young adults
with WS succeed on face recognition tasks by focusing on the
features of a face (Karmiloff-Smith, 1997). By manipulating
the features of face stimuli and the configuration of these
features, our data are the first to confirm that featural face
processing is indeed atypical in this population, and that both
featural and configural atypicalities are present early in childhood
and are thus not the outcome of a protracted developmental
process.
As far as concerns infants/toddlers with DS, although they
tended to look longer at the novel face in both the Featural and
Configural conditions, this difference did not reach significance.
It is possible that for DS infants the sample size was too small
to detect significant differences. It is also possible that the
infants/toddlers with DS may have required a greater number of
familiarization trials (than TD infants or those withWS) for them
to detect changes in the stimuli. As far as the authors are aware,
this is the first study to investigate face processing in such a young
population of children with DS, so information on the required
number of familiarization trials was not available. Nonetheless,
the fact that discrimination is more challenging for infants with
DS is a novel finding.
Although our TD infants demonstrated differential looking in
the Configural condition (as expected), it is unclear why they
showed a trend toward the familiarized face in the Featural
condition and a significant bias toward the novel face in the
Configural condition. Although children at this young age
often demonstrate a bias toward familiarized faces (a familiarity
preference), infant preferences can be driven by both novelty and
familiarity (Fantz, 1964; Zajonc, 1968; Berlyne, 1970; Slater et al.,
1983; Bornstein, 1989; Fang et al., 2007). It is possible that the TD
infants found the Configural condition easier than the Featural
condition; hence a novelty preference was elicited in the former
but not in the latter.
Alternatively, it is possible that the TD controls showed
a trending familiarity preference for the featurally-changed
faces because only local details (the eyes) had changed.
Variability in people’s eyes is something with which they
already have experience. By contrast, the novelty preference to
configurally-changed faces may have arisen because “squashed”
and “stretched” faces were extremely novel to them. We
hypothesize that the configural-changes were so unexpected
that they attracted the TD infants’ longer attention more than
changing the shape of the eyes. This hypothesis fits with theories
from the face-processing literature: it has been hypothesized
that the more discrepant a stimulus is from the observer’s state
of knowledge (i.e., from their internal template of face stimuli),
the more novel it is to the observer and the more likely it is to
elicit a novelty preference (Dember and Earl, 1957; Berlyne,
1960; McCall and McGhee, 1977). In other words, if something
is completely new and unknown, it attracts a relatively high
level of attention. This would explain why a novelty preference
emerged in the Configural condition and a trending familiarity
preference was demonstrated in the Featural condition in TD
controls.
Whatever themechanism turns out to be, it is important to note
that the TD controls weremore sensitive to the configural changes
than the featural changes. Furthermore, when we compare the
findings from the TD controls with those from the WS group,
it suggests that infants/toddlers with WS not only fail to notice
configural changes but also that they process featural information
atypically. This is because, unlike the controls, the participants
with WS showed a novelty preference to the featurally-changed
face. In other words, both featural and configural processing of
faces is atypical already in infancy in WS.
There are several potential limitations to the study, which
will be tested in future research. As mentioned, in this infant
study we opted for schematic rather than real faces for several
important reasons. First, it has already been shown that infants’
gaze behaviors to naturalistic faces do not differ from their
behaviors to schematic faces (e.g., Farroni et al., 2005). For
instance, Farroni et al. (2005) found that infants look longer at
upright faces than at inverted faces, as a function of contrast
polarity irrespective of whether the face stimuli were schematic
or naturalistic. Second, several studies have shown that the
mechanisms involved in processing schematic faces are the same
as those involved in processing naturalistic faces (see Johnson
et al., 2015, for review). Our choice of schematic faces allowed us
to control and manipulate their size and color contrasts, to make
them as attractive as possible to infant participants. Additionally,
although familiarization paradigms are frequently used in infancy
research, one might have preferred a habituation paradigm
allowing each infant to find her/his own time to fully encode
the model face. However, habituation studies are more prone
to subject loss than familiarization studies, and we were dealing
with a rare syndrome where subject loss is critical. Moreover, as
mentioned, since we used the same familiarized face throughout,
all infants had ample time to encode the model face. Thus we
opted for a familiarization study because of the rarity of WS and
the difficulty in recruiting sufficient numbers of young infants.
To our knowledge, this is indeed the first study to examine face
processing in neurodevelopmental disorders at such a young age.
Yet, to address fundamental questions in psychological theorizing
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in general, and in face processing in particular, it is crucial to trace
developmental trajectories back to their origins in infancy.
Although further research is necessary, our study provides
the first evidence that face processing atypicalities are already
present very early in the developmental trajectory of individuals
with WS. In other words, despite showing subsequent proficiency
on standardized face processing tasks, infants/toddlers with WS
do not process faces like TD young children. We have also
demonstrated that while face processing is atypical in another
neurodevelopmental disorder, DS, the two syndromes differ in
their strategies and thus the findings with WS cannot be simply
explained by low intelligence. In particular, our study highlights
the importance of tracing socio-cognitive deficits from very early
in development. Finally, our findings indicate that theorists can
no longer use the case of WS to support claims that evolution has
endowed the human brain with an independent face-processing
module.
Acknowledgments
This work was funded for AKS by a Wellcome Trust Strategic
Award (grant number: 098330/Z/12/Z) conferred upon The
London Down Syndrome (LonDownS) Consortium, and
also supported by the Williams Syndrome Foundation, the
Down Syndrome Association, and Down Syndrome Education
International. We should also like to thank the families who
participated in our study, without whom none of this would have
been possible.
References
Annaz, D., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Johnson,M.H., and Thomas,M. S. (2009). A cross-
syndrome study of the development of holistic face recognition in children with
autism, Down syndrome, and Williams syndrome. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 102,
456–486. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2008.11.005
Bayley, N. (1993). Bayley Scales of Infant Development: Manual. San Antonio, TX:
The Psychological Corporation.
Bellugi, U., Lichtenberger, L., Jones, W., Lai, Z., and St George, M. (2000).
I. The neurocognitive profile of Williams syndrome: a complex pattern
of strengths and weaknesses. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 12(Suppl. 1), 7–29. doi:
10.1162/089892900561959
Bellugi, U., Lichtenberger, L., Mills, D., Galaburda, A., and Korenberg, J. R.
(1999). Bridging cognition, the brain and molecular genetics: evidence from
Williams syndrome. Trends Neurosci. 22, 197–207. doi: 10.1016/S0166-2236(99)
01397-1
Bellugi, U., Marks, S., Bihrle, A., and Sabo, H. (1988a). “Dissociation between
language and cognitive functions in Williams syndrome,” in Language
Development in Exceptional Circumstances, eds D. Bishop and K. Mogford
(London: Churchill Livingstone), 177–189.
Bellugi, U., Sabo, H., and Vaid, J. (1988b). “Spatial deficits in children withWilliams
syndrome,” in Spatial Cognition: Brain Bases and Development, eds J. Stiles-
Davis and M. Kritchevsky (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.),
273–298.
Bellugi, U., Wang, P. P., and Jernigan, T. L. (1994). “Williams syndrome: an unusual
neuropsychological profile,” in Atypical Cognitive Deficits in Developmental
Disorders: Implications for Brain Function, eds S. H. Broman and J. Grafman
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.), 23–56.
Benton, A., Hamsher, K., Varney, N. R., and Spreen, O. (1983). Benton Test of Facial
Recognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berlyne, D. E. (1960).Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity. New York, NY:McGraw-Hill.
Berlyne, D. E. (1970). Novelty, complexity, and hedonic value. Percept. Psychophys.
8, 279–286. doi: 10.3758/BF03212593
Bihrle, A. M., Bellugi, U., Delis, D., and Marks, S. (1989). Seeing either the forest
or the trees: dissociation in visuospatial processing. Brain Cogn. 11, 37–49. doi:
10.1016/0278-2626(89)90003-1
Bodamer, J. (1990). Paper on prosopagnosia. Trans. H. D. Ellis and M. Florence.
Cogn. Neuropsychol. 7, 81–105. (Original work published 1947).
Bornstein, R. F. (1989). Exposure and affect: overview and meta-analysis of
research, 1968–1987. Psychol. Bull. 106, 265. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.106.2.265
Busigny, T., Graf, M., Mayer, E., and Rossion, B. (2010). Acquired prosopagnosia
as a face-specific disorder: ruling out the general visual similarity account.
Neuropsychologia 48, 2051–2067. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.03.026
Carey, S., and Diamond, R. (1977). From piecemeal to configurational processing
of faces. Science 195, 312–314. doi: 10.1126/science.831281
Dember, W. N., and Earl, R. W. (1957). Analysis of exploratory, manipulatory, and
curiosity behaviors. Psychol. Rev. 64, 91. doi: 10.1037/h0046861
Deruelle, C., Mancini, J., Livet, M. O., Casse-Perrot, C., and De Schonen, S. (1999).
Configural and local processing of faces in children with Williams syndrome.
Brain Cogn. 41, 276–298. doi: 10.1006/brcg.1999.1127
Deruelle, C., Rondan, C., Mancini, J., and Livet, M. (2003). Exploring face
processing in Williams syndrome. Cogn. Brain Behav. 7, 157–171.
Dimitriou, D., Leonard, H. C., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Johnson, M. H., and Thomas,
M. S. (2014). Atypical development of configural face recognition in children
with autism, Down syndrome and Williams syndrome. J Intellect. Disabil. Res.
59, 422–438. doi: 10.1111/jir.12141
Donnai, D., and Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2000). Williams syndrome: from genotype
through to the cognitive phenotype. Am. J. Med. Genet. 972, 164–171. doi:
10.1002/1096-8628(200022)97:2<164::AID-AJMG8>3.0.CO;2-F
D’Souza, D., Booth, R., Connolly, M., Happé, F., and Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2015).
Rethinking the concepts of “local or global processors”: evidence fromWilliams
syndrome, Down syndrome, and Autism Spectrum Disorders. Dev. Sci. doi:
10.1111/desc.12312 [Epub ahead of print].
D’Souza, D., and Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2011). When modularization fails to
occur: a developmental perspective. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 28, 276–287. doi:
10.1080/02643294.2011.614939
Duchaine, B., and Nakayama, K. (2005). Dissociations of face and object
recognition in developmental prosopagnosia. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 249–261.
doi: 10.1162/0898929053124857
Duchaine, B. C., and Nakayama, K. (2004). Developmental prosopagnosia and
the Benton Facial Recognition test. Neurology 62, 1219–1220. doi: 10.1212/
01.WNL.0000118297.03161.B3
Fang, X., Singh, S., and Ahluwalia, R. (2007). An examination of different
explanations for the mere exposure effect. J. Consum. Res. 34, 97–103. doi:
10.1086/513050
Fantz, R. L. (1964). Visual experience in infants: decreased attention to
familiar patterns relative to novel ones. Science 146, 668–670. doi: 10.1126/
science.146.3644.668
Farran, E. K., and Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2012). Neurodevelopmental Disorders
Across the Lifespan: A Neuroconstructivist Approach. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Farroni, T., Johnson, M. H., Menon, E., Zulian, L., Faraguna, D., and Csibra,
G. (2005). Newborns’ preference for face-relevant stimuli: efforts of contrast
polarity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 102, 17245–17250. doi: 10.1073/
pnas.0502205102
Golarai, G., Hong, S., Haas, B. W., Galaburda, A. M., Mills, D. L., Bellugi, U., et al.
(2010). The fusiform face area is enlarged inWilliams syndrome. J. Neurosci. 30,
6700–6712. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.4268-09.2010
Goren, C. C., Sarty, M., and Wu, P. Y. (1975). Visual following and pattern
discrimination of face-like stimuli by newborn infants. Pediatrics 56, 544–549.
Grice, S. J., de Haan, M., Halit, H., Johnson, M. H., Csibra, G., Grant, J., et al.
(2003). ERP abnormalities of illusory contour perception inWilliams syndrome.
Neuroreport 14, 1773–1777.
Hollich, G. (2005). Supercoder: A Program for Coding Preferential Looking (version
1.5). West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University.
Johnson, M. H., Dziurawiec, S., Ellis, H., and Morton, J. (1991). Newborns’
preferential tracking of face-like stimuli and its subsequent decline. Cognition
40, 1–19. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(91)90045-6
Johnson, M. H., Senju, A., and Tomalski, P. (2015). The two-process theory of
face processing: modifications based on two decades of data from infants and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 7608
D’Souza et al. Face processing in Williams syndrome
adults. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 50, 169–179. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.
10.009
Kanwisher, N. (2000). Domain specificity in face perception. Nat. Neurosci. 3,
759–763. doi: 10.1038/77664
Kanwisher, N. (2010). Functional specificity in the human brain: a window into
the functional architecture of the mind. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107,
11163–11170. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1005062107
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., and Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: a
module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. J. Neurosci.
17, 4302–4311.
Kanwisher, N., Stanley, D., and Harris, A. (1999). The fusiform face area is
selective for faces not animals.Neuroreport 10, 183–187. doi: 10.1097/00001756-
199901180-00035
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1997). Crucial differences between developmental cognitive
neuroscience and adult neuropsychology. Dev. Neuropsychol. 13, 513–524. doi:
10.1080/87565649709540693
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1998). Development itself is the key to understanding
developmental disorders. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2, 389–398. doi: 10.1016/S1364-
6613(98)01230-3
Karmiloff-Smith, A., D’Souza, D., Dekker, T. M., Van Herwegen, J., Xu, F.,
Rodic, M., et al. (2012). Genetic and environmental vulnerabilities in children
with neurodevelopmental disorders. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, 2,
17261–17265. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1121087109
Karmiloff-Smith, A., Thomas, M., Annaz, D., Humphreys, K., Ewing, S., Brace,
N., et al. (2004). Exploring the Williams syndrome face-processing debate: the
importance of building developmental trajectories. J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry
45, 1258–1274. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.2004.00322.x
Laing, E., Butterworth, G., Ansari, D., Gsödl, M., Longhi, E., Panagiotaki, G., et al.
(2002). Atypical development of language and social communication in toddlers
with Williams syndrome. Dev. Sci. 5, 233–246. doi: 10.1111/1467-7687.00225
Leder, H., and Bruce, V. (2000). When inverted faces are recognized: the role of
configural information in face recognition. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 53, 513–536.
doi: 10.1080/713755889
Liu, S., Anzures, G., Ge, L., Quinn, P. C., Pascalis, O., Slater, A. M., et al. (2013).
Development of recognition of face parts from unfamiliar faces. Infant Child
Dev. 22, 165–179. doi: 10.1002/icd.1781
Maurer, D., Grand, R. L., and Mondloch, C. J. (2002). The many faces of configural
processing. Trends Cogn. Sci. 6, 255–260. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01903-4
McCall, R. B., and McGhee, P. E. (1977). “The discrepancy hypothesis of attention
and affect in infants,” in The Structuring of Experience, eds I. C. Uzgiris and F.
Weizmann (New York, NY: Plenum), 179–210.
McCarthy, G., Puce, A., Gore, J. C., and Allison, T. (1997). Face-specific
processing in the human fusiform gyrus. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 605–610. doi:
10.1162/jocn.1997.9.5.605
Mervis, C. B., and Bertrand, J. (1997). “Developmental relations between
cognition and language: evidence from Williams syndrome,” in Research on
Communication and Language Disorders: Contributions to Theories of Language
Development, eds L. B. Adamson and M. A. Romski (New York, NY: Brookes),
75–106.
Mills, D., Alvarez, T. D., St. George, M., Appelbaum, L. G., Bellugi, U., and
Neville,H. (2000). III. Electrophysiological studies of face processing inWilliams
syndrome. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 12, 47–64. doi: 10.1162/089892900561977
Mobbs, D., Garrett, A. S., Menon, V., Rose, F. E., Bellugi, U., and Reiss, A. L.
(2004). Anomalous brain activation during face and gaze processing inWilliams
syndrome. Neurology 62, 2070–2076. doi: 10.1212/01.WNL.0000129536.
95274.DC
Mondloch, C. J., Le Grand, R., and Maurer, D. (2002). Configural face processing
develops more slowly than featural face processing. Perception 31, 553–566. doi:
10.1068/p3339
Moscovitch, M., Winocur, G., and Behrmann, M. (1997). What is special about
face recognition? Nineteen experiments on a person with visual object agnosia
and dyslexia but normal face recognition. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 555–604. doi:
10.1162/jocn.1997.9.5.555
Pani, J. R., Mervis, C. B., and Robinson, B. F. (1999). Global spatial organization
by individuals with Williams syndrome. Psychol. Sci. 10, 453–458. doi:
10.1111/1467-9280.00186
Piepers, D. W., and Robbins, R. A. (2012). A review and clarification of the terms
“holistic,” “configural,” and “relational” in the face perception literature. Front.
Psychol. 3:559. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00559
Puce, A., Allison, T., Asgari, M., Gore, J. C., and McCarthy, G. (1996).
Differential sensitivity of human visual cortex to faces, letter-strings, and
textures: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. J. Neurosci. 16,
5205–5215.
Rossen, M. L., Jones, W., Wang, P. P., and Klima, E. S. (1995). Face processing:
remarkable sparing in Williams syndrome. J. Genet. Couns. 6, 138–140.
Slater, A., Morison, V., and Rose, D. (1983). Locus of habituation in the human
newborn. Perception 12, 593–598. doi: 10.1068/p120593
Tager-Flusberg, H., Plesa-Skwerer, D., Faja, S., and Joseph, R. M. (2003). People
with Williams syndrome process faces holistically. Cognition 89, 11–24. doi:
10.1016/S0010-0277(03)00049-0
Tanaka, J. W., and Farah, M. J. (1993). Parts and wholes in face recognition. Q. J.
Exp. Psychol. A 46, 225–245. doi: 10.1080/14640749308401045
Tong, F., Nakayama, K., Moscovitch, M., Weinrib, O., and Kanwisher, N. (2000).
Response properties of the human fusiform face area. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 17,
257–280. doi: 10.1080/026432900380607
Turati, C., Di Giorgio, E., Bardi, L., and Simion, F. (2010). Holistic face
processing in newborns, 3-month-old infants, and adults: evidence from the
composite face effect. Child Dev. 81, 1894–1905. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2010.
01520.x
Wang, P. P., Doherty, S., Rourke, S. B., and Bellugi, U. (1995). Unique profile
of visuo-perceptual skills in a genetic syndrome. Brain Cogn. 29, 54–65. doi:
10.1006/brcg.1995.1267
Wilson, B., Cockburn, J., and Baddeley, A. D. (1986). The Rivermead Behavioural
Memory Test. Bury St Edmunds: Thames Valley Test Company.
Yin, R. K. (1969). Looking at upside-down faces. J. Exp. Psychol. 81, 141–145. doi:
10.1037/h0027474
Young, A. W., Hellawell, D., and Hay, D. C. (1987). Configurational information in
face perception. Perception 16, 747–759. doi: 10.1068/p160747
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 9,
1–27. doi: 10.1037/h0025848
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015D’Souza, Cole, Farran, Brown,Humphreys, Howard, Rodic, Dekker,
D’Souza and Karmiloff-Smith. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordancewith
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 7609
